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Physical Layer Security with Threshold-Based
Multiuser Scheduling in Multi-antenna Wireless
Networks
Maoqiang Yang, Student Member, IEEE, Daoxing Guo, Member, IEEE, Yuzhen Huang, Member, IEEE, Trung Q.
Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, and Bangning Zhang
Abstract—In this paper, we consider a multiuser downlink
wiretap network consisting of one base station (BS) equipped
with AA antennas, NB single-antenna legitimate users, and NE
single-antenna eavesdroppers over Nakagami-m fading channels.
In particular, we introduce a joint secure transmission scheme
that adopts transmit antenna selection (TAS) at the BS and
explores threshold-based selection diversity (tSD) scheduling over
legitimate users to achieve a good secrecy performance while
maintaining low implementation complexity. More specifically, in
an effort to quantify the secrecy performance of the considered
system, two practical scenarios are investigated, i.e., Scenario I:
the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) is unavailable
at the BS, and Scenario II: the eavesdropper’s CSI is available
at the BS. For Scenario I, novel exact closed-form expressions
of the secrecy outage probability are derived, which are valid
for general networks with an arbitrary number of legitimate
users, antenna configurations, number of eavesdroppers, and
the switched threshold. For Scenario II, we take into account
the ergodic secrecy rate as the principle performance metric,
and derive novel closed-form expressions of the exact ergodic
secrecy rate. Additionally, we also provide simple and asymptotic
expressions for secrecy outage probability and ergodic secrecy
rate under two distinct cases, i.e., Case I: the legitimate user is
located close to the BS, and Case II: both the legitimate user and
eavesdropper are located close to the BS. Our important findings
reveal that the secrecy diversity order is AAmA and the slope
of secrecy rate is one under Case I, while the secrecy diversity
order and the slope of secrecy rate collapse to zero under Case
II, where the secrecy performance floor occurs. Finally, when the
switched threshold is carefully selected, the considered scheduling
scheme outperforms other well known existing schemes in terms
of the secrecy performance and complexity tradeoff.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, multiuser switched di-
versity, threshold-based scheduling scheme, secrecy outage prob-
ability, ergodic secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURITY and privacy have attracted enormous attentionin the wireless communications since the inherent broad-
cast nature of radio propagation makes the data transmission
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particularly susceptible to malicious attacks [1]. To address
intricate secure problems, many researchers have investigated
various cryptographic protocols in the upper layer, from which
an error-free link of physical layer was assumed to guarantee
the reliability of data transmission. As being well-known,
the key idea behind traditional cryptographic techniques lies
in the complex mathematical operations, which, however,
have become increasingly insecure due to the fact that the
computational ability of eavesdropper becomes more and more
powerful. Motivated by this limitation, physical layer security
(PLS) has been introduced as an attractive approach to defend
against malicious attack and wiretapping by exploiting the
distinct characteristics of different wireless channels. The
concept of PLS was pioneered by Shannon in [2], and further
extended by Wyner in [3], where the condition of perfect
secrecy was analyzed in view of an information-theoretic
prospective. Later on, various advanced techniques, i.e., mul-
tiple antennas, multiuser diversity, and cooperative relaying,
have been broadly exploited to improve the PLS of wireless
transmissions.
In recent years, significant research efforts have been de-
voted to incorporating multi-antenna techniques to improve the
performance of wireless communication systems. Specifically,
transmit antenna selection (TAS) has been widely investigated
due to the low realization complexity of radio frequency (RF)
chains while achieving full diversity [4]–[6]. The authors in [7]
analyzed the secrecy performance in multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) wiretap channels with TAS and different
receiver combining schemes. In [8], TAS with Alamouti
coding and power allocation was addressed in MIMO wiretap
channels. Additionally, TAS and receive generalized selection
combining (TAS/GSC) was proposed for improving the se-
curity in the MIMO wiretap channels [9]. Furthermore, the
work [10] investigated the secrecy performance for TAS and
maximal ratio combining (TAS/MRC) system with imperfect
feedback. More recently, TAS was also carried out both at
the multi-antenna primary and secondary transmitter (ST) in
cognitive wiretap systems [11], [12], where the ST acts as a
friendly jammer to confound the eavesdropper and is granted
to share the spectrum of the primary network as a reward.
Besides these works, the secrecy performance of antenna-
selection-aided MIMO system was addressed in [13] in terms
of the probability of zero secrecy capacity and generalized
secrecy diversity.
On the other hand, multiuser diversity technique has aroused
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much attention from both academia and industry. Different
from single user communication systems, multiuser communi-
cation systems are more susceptible to malicious attacks [14]–
[17]. In [14], the secrecy outage performance of multiuser
MIMO systems with TAS and arbitrary number of eaves-
droppers was addressed. In [15], the authors investigated the
secrecy performance of multiuser downlink networks with the
artificial noise by designing an optimal power allocation to
maximize the total ergodic secrecy capacity of the system. In
[16], to increase the secure degrees of freedom of the main
channel, different opportunistic jammer selection schemes
were proposed in multiuser wiretap networks. In [17], an
optimal user selection scheme for multiuser relaying networks
with cooperative jamming was analyzed in terms of the ergodic
secrecy rate. In addition, the impact of different scheduling
schemes on the secrecy performance of multiuser wiretapping
networks has been investigated in [18]–[20]. Particularly, in
[18], the authors have explored the PLS of cognitive radio
networks with different scheduling schemes and made a
comprehensive comparison for the achievable secrecy rate.
Later, in [19], an on-off opportunistic beamforming for the
multiuser downlink channels with a passive eavesdropper was
investigated. In [20], two opportunistic scheduling algorithms
of multiuser uplink wiretap networks taking into consideration
of the fairness among legitimate users were designed. Albeit
the above-mentioned works have improved our understanding
on the impact of user scheduling on the secrecy performance,
the main limitation behind these works is the high complexity
of the scheduling schemes owing to the continuous estimation
for the channel state information (CSI) of the main channel.
As a result, a significant proportion of the air-link resource
and battery life of the mobile terminals are utilized for the
CSI feedback instead of valuable data transmission.
In an effort to reduce the CSI feedback load of tradi-
tional scheduling schemes, the concept of multiuser switched-
diversity opportunistic scheduling was firstly proposed in [21],
which is to find any acceptable user instead of the best
one by exploiting a threshold-based and ordered scheduling
mechanism. The main idea behind switched diversity is to
trade off part of desired multiuser diversity gains for con-
siderable savings with regard to the CSI feedback require-
ments. In recent years, extensive efforts have been devoted
to incorporating switched diversity in wireless communication
systems [22]–[27]. However, few works have addressed the
secure transmission issue of the switched diversity based
opportunistic scheduling scheme. A recent work [28] firstly
addressed a threshold-based branch selection scheme, namely
switch-and-examine combining (SEC), to achieve a better
tradeoff between the secrecy outage performance and imple-
mentation cost in classical wiretap networks. In [29], [30], a
more preferred alternative termed SEC with post-examining
selection (SECps) was investigated in the multiuser downlink
wiretap networks. To be specific, the SEC or SECps scheme
examines the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of each branch in one
by one manner with a predefined switched threshold. Once any
branch exceeds the switched threshold, it will be selected for
data transmission. The difference between SEC and SECps
scheme exists in their last step where SEC keeps the last
examined branch, while SECps selects the best one instead.
In particular, an improved threshold-based switched diversity
(termed tSD) strategy was proposed in [31] and extended to
different communication scenarios. Different from SEC and
SECps scheme, the tSD scheme first examines whether the
previous selected branch exceeds the predetermined switched
threshold. If this is the case, this branch is kept, otherwise the
scheduler switches to the branch that yields the best channel
quality.
While the aforementioned works have laid a solid founda-
tion for the investigation of threshold-based switched diversity
scheduling in multiuser downlink networks, the PLS issues in
multiuser multi-antenna networks with multiple eavesdroppers
are still not well understood and the channel fading severity on
the secrecy performance of these networks remains unknown.
With this in mind, in this paper, we introduce a hybrid
scheme combining TAS with threshold-based selection diver-
sity opportunistic scheduling, namely TAS/tSD, in a multiuser
multi-antenna wiretap network over Nakagami-m channels.
More specifically, we present a comprehensive secrecy perfor-
mance analysis of the considered network under two practical
eavesdropping scenarios, i.e., Scenario I: The CSI of eaves-
dropping channel is not available at the base station (BS),
and Scenario II: The CSI of the eavesdropping channel is
available at the BS1. The main contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
 For Scenario I, we first derive novel exact closed-form
expressions for the secrecy outage probability and non-
zero secrecy rate with arbitrary transmit antenna con-
figurations and channel fading severity, the number of
legitimate users, and the number of eavesdroppers as
well as the switched threshold, from which the impact
of key system parameters on the secrecy performance of
multiuser wiretap networks with TAS/tSD can be readily
evaluated.
 For Scenario I, in order to achieve more insights, we
derive new closed-form approximate expressions of the
secrecy outage probability in high SNR regimes for two
different cases, i.e., Case I: the legitimate user is located
close to the BS and Case II: both the legitimate user
and eavesdropper are located close to the BS. According
to the derived expressions, we find that for Case I,
the secrecy diversity order is decided by the number
of transmit antennas and the channel fading severity of
main channel, while for Case II, the secrecy diversity
order collapses to zero and the secrecy performance floor
occurs.
 For Scenario II, we derive new exact closed-form expres-
sions for the ergodic secrecy rate, from which we can
accurately examine the impact of the system parameters
on the ergodic secrecy rate of the considered networks
with TAS/tSD scheme.
 For Scenario II, we derive new closed-form approximate
expressions of the ergodic secrecy rate in the high SNR
1Similarly as in [1], [9], [33], [34], [40], we consider the case that the
CSIs of the eavesdropper’s channels are obtained at the BS, which potentially
demonstrates that their transmissions can be monitored.
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Fig. 1: System model
regime. Based on the derived results, we characterize
the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate in terms of the high
SNR slope and high SNR power offset. Our findings
demonstrate that the high SNR slope remains one for
Case I, while collapses to zero for Case II. However, the
high SNR power offset depends on the number of transmit
antennas and the fading severity of main channel as well
as the involved parameters of the eavesdropping channel.
 Our results also demonstrate that the considered TAS/tSD
scheme achieves a better secrecy performance than the
TAS/SECps scheme at the expense of negligible increas-
ing complexity. In addition, compared to the best schedul-
ing scheme, the TAS/tSD scheduling scheme achieves a
similar secrecy performance, while the average number
of user examinations of TAS/tSD scheme is significantly
reduced.
Notation: We utilize bold lower/upper case symbols to
represent vectors/matrics. We denote jj the absolute value and 


is the binomial coefficient. The notation O () represents
higher order function, Pr [] is the probability, the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) and the probability distribution
function (PDF) of random variable (RV) X are denoted
as FX (x) and fX (x), respectively. Ei () denotes the one-
argument exponential integral function. E [] stands for the
expectation operator and   () denotes the Gamma function.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
Let us consider a multiuser downlink wiretap network as
in Fig. 1, which consists of one BS equipped with AA
antennas, NB single-antenna legitimate users (Bobs), and NE
single-antenna eavesdroppers (Eves). The system considered
in this paper is applicable to practical multiuser scenarios, for
instance, the Internet of Things (IoT) and Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN). The main link and eavesdropper’s link are
assumed to be quasi-static independent and non-identically
distributed (i.n.i.d.) block Nakagami-m fading, and remain
unchanged during the coherence time. In addition, each block
transmission time, being equal to the channel coherence time,
is composed of two parts, i.e., guard interval and data trans-
mission interval. During the guard interval phase, BS first
selects a desired legitimate user and transmit antenna pair
according to the considered TAS/tSD scheme. After that, the
data transmission is completed between the selected legitimate
user and transmit antenna in the following interval.
To achieve secrecy, the BS encodes the message block
w into the codeword x = [x (1) ; :::; x (i) ; :::x (n)] with
1
n
Pn
i=1 E
h
jx (i)j2
i
 P according to capacity achieving
codebook for the wiretap channel. As such, the received
instantaneous SNRs at the k-th legitimate user and at the n-th
Eve associated with the -th transmit antenna are expressed,
respectively, as
b;k =
P jh;kj2
2b
(1)
and
e;n =
P jg;nj2
2e
(2)
where P denotes the transmit power of the BS, h;k denotes
the channel coefficient between the -th antenna and the k-th
legitimate user, g;n represents the channel coefficient between
-th antenna and the n-th eavesdropper, 2b and 
2
e denote
the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) variance at each
legitimate user and eavesdropper, respectively.
In the following, we describe the basic principle of TAS/tSD
scheme [31] in detail, from which an acceptable legitimate user
is selected by the BS associated with a specific antenna.
 We begin with the first transmit antenna ( = 1) of the
tSD scheme. The BS estimates whether the instantaneous
SNR b;k of the previously selected legitimate user for
this transmit antenna exceeds the predetermined threshold
T, i.e., if tSDB; = 
b
;k > T, the processing procedure
of tSD terminates for this transmit antenna.
 Otherwise, once the instantaneous SNR of the previ-
ously selected legitimate user is below the threshold, i.e.,
b;k < T, the legitimate user with the highest SNR
is selected for this transmit antenna, wherein tSDB; =
max
 
b;1; 
b
;2; :::; 
b
;NB

. The same user scheduling
operation repeats for the remaining transmit antennas
sequentially.
 As per the TAS scheme, the transmit antenna and legit-
imate user pair that results in the largest instantaneous
SNR is selected for the following transmission interval.
The index of selected transmit antenna  is given by
 = argmax
1AA
 
tSDB;

(3)
Without loss of generality, we assume that the selection
procedure of legitimate user and transmit antenna pair is
done at a central scheduler (i.e., at the BS). Meanwhile,
the requirement of feedback information includes not only
legitimate user indexes, but also the received SNRs. Different
from the conventional application without secrecy constraint,
the resulting largest SNR is exploited by the BS for the
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construction of wiretap code2.
We also remark that selecting the best antenna at the BS is
optimal for the legitimate channels, however, it corresponds to
a random transmit antenna in the perspective of eavesdroppers.
As such, the Eves could hardly achieve any additional transmit
diversity from the selected antenna.
Due to the fact that each eavesdropper has received the
signal from BS, we consider the most powerful colluding
eavesdropper attacking scenario, where the eavesdroppers can
share their available observations to decode the confidential
messages. From the eavesdropper’s design perspective, the
colluding eavesdropping scenario yields the best possible
performance of illegitimate link while it represents the worst
case scenario in the viewpoint of secure transmission [35]–
[37]. Additionally, all Eves are assumed to be perfectly col-
luded where the inter-eavesdropper channels are considered
error-free. In doing so, the maximal ratio combining (MRC)
scheme is adopted among the eavesdroppers to achieve the
best wiretapping performance.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a comprehensive analysis on the
secrecy performance of the considered system with TAS/tSD
scheme. Before delving into the detailed analysis, we first
present the statistical characteristics of legitimate channel and
eavesdropping channel.
A. Preliminaries
Based on the aforementioned TAS/tSD scheme, it is obvious
that the events of selecting an acceptable user are mutually
exclusive for a specific transmit antenna , therefore, the CDF
of the end-to-end instantaneous SNR tSDB; is given by [31]
FtSDB; () = Pr

tSDB;  

=
NBX
k=1
Pr

tSDB; = 
b
;k&
b
;k  

(4)
Besides, each legitimate link is assumed to follow indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Nakagami-m distribu-
tion3. Following the same steps as developed in [31], thus the
CDF of tSDB; can be rewritten as
FtSDB; () =
8>>><>>>:
Fb;k ()  Fb;k (T)
+Fb;k (T)
h
Fb;k()
iNB 1
;   Th
Fb;k ()
iNB
;  < T
(5)
where
Fb;k () = 1  exp

 mB
B

mB 1X
k=0
1
k!

mB
B

k
(6)
2Similar as in [31], we assume in the following analysis that there is no
feedback error or delay in the transmission, while each legitimate user has
perfect CSI of its own.
3Similar to the work in [23], [32], we assume the i.i.d. fading channels
where legitimate users are located approximately the same distance from
the BS, or they are distributed in the whole cluster and slow power control
protocol is employed.
and
fb;k () =

mA
B
mB mB 1
  (mB)
exp

 mB
B


(7)
denote the CDF and PDF of b;k, respectively. Moreover,
B = E
h
b;k
i
represents the average SNR of each legitimate
link and mB is the fading severity of the legitimate channel.
Let us define B as the end-to-end instantaneous SNR of
TAS/tSD scheme. According to the principle of TAS, B can
be presented as B = max
 
tSDB;

. Therefore, the CDF of B
is given by
FB () =
h
FtSDB; ()
iAA
(8)
Moreover, resorting to binomial theorem [41, Eq.(1.111)], the
CDF of B can be rewritten as (9).
On the other hand, since MRC scheme is adopted at the
colluding eavesdroppers, the end-to-end instantaneous SNR of
the colluding eavesdroppers is E =
PNE
n=1 
e
;n, where 

represents the selected antenna at the BS. Thus, the CDF and
PDF of E are, respectively, expressed as
FE () = 1  exp

 mE
E

NEmE 1X
k=0
1
k!

mE
E

k
(10)
and
fE () =

mE
E
NEmE NEmE 1
  (NEmE)
exp

 mE
E


(11)
where E = E
h
e;n
i
denotes the average SNR of eaves-
dropper’s channel and mE denotes the fading severity of the
wiretap channel.
The instantaneous secrecy rate Cs of the considered system
is given by
Cs = [CB   CE]+ = [log (1 + B)  log (1 + E)]+ (12)
where
[u]
+
= max (u; 0) =

u; u > 0
0; u  0 (13)
while CB = log (1 + B) and CE = log (1 + E) repre-
sent the instantaneous rate of the legitimate channel and
wiretap channel, respectively. According to [34], [38], when
the eavesdropper’s CSI is not available at the BS, i.e., the
passive eavesdropping scenario, BS has no choice but to
assume the instantaneous rate of the eavesdropping channel
as ~CE = CB   Rs to achieve secure transmission, where
Rs denotes a constant secrecy rate chosen by the BS. Then,
the BS constructs the wiretap codes by exploiting CB and
~CE. If Rs  Cs (i.e., ~CE  CE), the codewords insure a
perfect secrecy. Otherwise, if Rs > Cs (i.e., ~CE < CE),
the confidential data can be overheard by the eavesdroppers
and the secrecy is compromised. Hence, the secrecy outage
probability is adopted as a useful and well-acceptable secrecy
performance metric under this scenario.
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FB () =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
AAP
q=0
 
AA
q
h
Fb;k (T)
iq qP
q1=0
 
q
q1

( 1)q1
(NB 1)(q q1)+AA qP
q2=0
 
(NB 1)(q q1)+AA q
q2

( 1)q2
 exp

 mBq2B

B;q2

mB
B
B
B ;   T
AANBP
q=0
 
AANB
q

( 1)q exp

 mBqB

B;q

mB
B
B
B ;  < T
(9)
where
B;q =
qX
n1=0
n1X
n2=0
:::
nmB 2X
nmB 1=0
q!
nmB 1!
mB 1Y
t=1
"
(t!)
nt+1 nt
(nt 1   nt)!
#
; n0 = q; nmB = 0; B =
mB 1X
p=1
np
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
According to [1], [34], the secrecy outage probability is
defined as Pout (Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs). Mathematically, the
secrecy outage probability can be formulated as
Pout (Rs)=Pr (Cs < RsjB > E) Pr (B > E)
+Pr (B < E) (14)
Following the detailed algebraic manipulations in [1], we have
Pout (Rs) =
Z 1
0
Z 2Rs (1+y) 1
0
fB (x) fE (y) dxdy
=
Z 1
0
FB
 
2Rs (1 + y)  1 fE (y) dy (15)
where fB (x) is the PDF of B. Due to the fact that the
switched threshold T is incorporated in the CDF of B
as shown in (9), there exists relationship between the term
2Rs (1 + y)  1 and T in (15), i.e., 2Rs (1 + y)  1  T or
2Rs (1 + y)   1 < T. To facilitate the analysis in (15), here
we introduce a bound point as H(T) = 2 Rs (1 + T)   1.
As such, the secrecy outage probability can be converted to a
piecewise one with respect to the bound point as
Pout (Rs) =
8><>:
R H(T)
0
FB
 
y

fE (y) dy +
R1
H(T)
FB
 
y

fE (y) dy; H(T)  0R1
0
FB
 
y

fE (y) dy; H(T) < 0
(16)
where y = 2
Rs (1 + y)   1. In what follows, by sub-
stituting (7) and (9) into (16) and utilizing the results in
[41, Eqs. (1.111), (3.351.2) and (3.351.3)], the exact closed-
form expression of secrecy probability can be obtained in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. The secrecy outage probability of multiuser multi-
antenna wiretap networks with TAS/tSD scheme is given as
(17), where  (; ) and   (; ) denote the lower and upper in-
complete Gamma function [41, Eqs. (8.350.1) and (8.350.2)],
respectively.
It is worth mentioning that other secrecy performance
metrics can be conveniently calculated from (17). For instance,
the probability of positive secrecy can be easily evaluated by
setting Rs = 0 into (17), i.e., Pr (Cs > 0) = 1  Pout (0).
In general, due to the complexity of the involved expres-
sions, it is difficult to explore the effect of system parameters
on the secrecy performance from (17). In order to achieve
more insights from (17), we provide an asymptotic secrecy
outage analysis in the high SNR regime via the following key
corollaries.
Corollary 1. When B !1 and E is fixed, the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability of multiuser multi-antenna wiretap
networks with TAS/tSD scheme is given by
Pout (Rs)=(  B) 	 +O
 
 	B

; (18)
where the secrecy diversity order is 	 = AAmB, and the
secrecy array gain  is given by (19).
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
From Corollary 1, we highlight that the secrecy diversity
gain is determined by the number of transmit antennas at the
BS and the fading severity of the legitimate channel, which is
independent of the number of legitimate users or eavesdrop-
pers, (i.e., NB or NE), and the average SNR of eavesdropping
channel E. However, the effect of these involved parameters
on the secrecy outage performance can be described by the
secrecy array gain.
In what follows, we consider the case of B ! 1 and
E !1 with a fixed main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER), i.e.,
B
E
= be.
Corollary 2. In the case of B ! 1 and E ! 1 with
B
E
= be, both legitimate user and eavesdropper are located
close to the BS, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability with
TAS/tSD scheme is derived as
P1out (Rs) 
AAX
q=0

AA
q

( 1)qB;q

mB2
Rs
mE
B
(be)
B


mB2
Rsq
mE
be + 1
 (NEmE+B)  (NEmE + B)
  (NEmE)
(20)
Proof: Based on (17), the asymptotic secrecy outage
probability can be easily derived after some algebraic manip-
ulations.
According to (20), we confirm that the secrecy outage
probability approaches a constant at high SNR value, which
implies that the secrecy diversity gain is not achievable for
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Pout (Rs) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:

mE
E
NEmE
1
 (NEmE)
(
AANBP
q=0
 
AANB
q

( 1)qexp

 mBqB
 
2Rs   1B;qmB(2Rs 1)B B BP
s=0
 
B
s

2Rs
2Rs 1
s


mE
E
+ mB2
Rsq
B
 (NEmE+s)


NEmE+s;

mE
E
+mB2
Rsq
B

H(T)

+
AAP
q=0
 
AA
q
h
Fb;k (T)
iq qP
q1=0
 
q
q1

( 1)q1
[(NB 1)(q q1)+AA q]P
q2=0
 
(NB 1)(q q1)+AA q
q2

( 1)q2 exp

 mBq2B
 
2Rs   1B;q2mB(2Rs 1)B B

BP
s=0
 
B
s

2Rs
2Rs 1
s
 

NEmE+s;

mB2
Rsq2
B
+mEE

H(T)

mB2
Rsq2
B
+ mEE
 (NEmE+s))
;H(T)  0
mE
E
NEmE
1
 (NEmE)
(
AAP
q=0
 
AA
q
h
Fb;k (T)
iq qP
q1=0
 
q
q1

( 1)q1
[(NB 1)(q q1)+AA q]P
q2=0
 
(NB 1)(q q1)+AA q
q2

 ( 1)q2 exp

 mBq2B
 
2Rs 1B;qmB(2Rs 1)B B BP
s=0
 
B
s

2Rs
2Rs 1
s
mB2
Rsq2
B
+mEE
 (NEmE+s)
   (NEmE+s)

; H(T) < 0
(17)
 =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
"
1
 (NEmE)

mB
mB
mB !
AA AAP
q=0
 
AA
q

( 1)q(T)mBq
 
2Rs   1mB(AA q)mB(AA q)P
q1=0
 
mB(AA q)
q1



2Rs
2Rs 1
q1
mE
E
 q1
 

NEmE+q1;
mE
E
H(T)
 1
;H(T)  0"
1
 (NEmE)

mB
mB
mB !
AA AAP
q=0
 
AA
q

( 1)q(T)mBq
 
2Rs   1mB(AA q)mB(AA q)P
q1=0
 
mB(AA q)
q1



2Rs
2Rs 1
q1
mE
E
 q1
  (NEmE+q1)
 1
; H(T) < 0
(19)
this particular case. Besides, it is noteworthy that increasing
the transmit power at the BS does not improve the secrecy
performance.
C. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
In this subsection, we concentrate on the scenario where the
CSI of the eavesdropping channel is available at BS. As such,
the BS adjusts the transmission rate adaptively with the wiretap
coding scheme. More specifically, any average transmission
rate below the ergodic secrecy rate of the channel is achievable
in principle [1], [9]. Different from the Scenario I, here we take
the ergodic secrecy rate as a principal metric to evaluate the
secrecy performance of the considered system with TAS/tSD
scheme.
According to [9], the ergodic secrecy rate is given by
Cs =
Z 1
0
Z 1
y
[log2 (1 + x)  log2 (1 + y)]
fB (x) fE (y) dxdy
(21)
To solve the above double integral, we follow the similar
procedures as introduced in [9]. First, the inner integral can
be evaluated with the adoption of integration by parts, and
then applying some mathematical manipulations, the ergodic
secrecy rate can be further written as in [9, Eq. (15)]
Cs =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
FE (y)
1 + y
[1  FB (y)] dy (22)
Moreover, by taking the switched threshold T into account,
the ergodic secrecy rate can be re-expressed as
Cs =
1
ln 2
Z T
0
FE (y)
1 + y
[1  FB (y)] dy
+
Z 1
T
FE (y)
1 + y
[1  FB (y)] dy
 (23)
Now, by substituting (9) and (10) into (23), resorting to the
new derived formulae of integration (44), (46) and (48) in
Appendix B and performing some algebraic manipulations, the
ergodic secrecy rate can be derived in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The exact ergodic secrecy rate of multiuser multi-
antenna wiretap networks with TAS/tSD scheme is given as
Cs =
1
ln 2
 
C1 + C2

(24)
where C1 and C2 are expressed in (25) and (26), respectively.
In what follows, to evaluate the impact of key system
parameters on the ergodic secrecy rate, we also look into the
ergodic secrecy rate in the high SNR regime. We first consider
the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate in the case of B ! 1
and a fixed E.
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C1 =
(
 
AANBP
q=1
 
AANB
q

( 1)qB;q

mB
B
B
exp

mBq
B
 BP
k=0
 
B
k

( 1)B k

mBq
B
 k h
 

k; mBqB

  

k; mBqB (T + 1)
iNEmE 1P
k=0
1
k!

mE
E
k AANBP
q=1
 
AANB
q

( 1)qB;q

mB
B
B
exp

mBq
B
+ mEE


B+kP
k1=0
 
B+k
k1

( 1)B+k k1

mBq
B
+ mEE
 k1 h
 

k1;
mBq
B
+ mEE

   

k1;

mBq
B
+ mEE

(T + 1)
i) (25)
C2 =
(
 
AAP
q0=1
 
AA
q0

( 1)q0B;q0

mB
B
B
exp

mBq0
B
 BP
k1=0
 
B
k1

( 1)B k1

mBq0
B
 k1
 

k1;
mBq0
B
(T + 1)

+
NEmE 1P
k=0
1
k!

mE
E
k AAP
q0=1
 
AA
q0

( 1)q0B;q0

mB
B
B
exp

mBq0
B
+ mEE
 k+BP
k1=0
 
AA
k1

( 1)k+B k1


mBq0
B
+ mEE
 k1
 

k1;

mBq0
B
+ mEE

(T + 1)

 
AAP
q=1
 
AA
q
h
Fb;k (T)
iq qP
q1=0
 
q
q1

( 1)q1
[(NB 1)(q q1)+AA q]P
q2=0
 (NB 1)(q q1)+AA qq2 ( 1)q2B;q2mBB B expmBq2B  BP
k1=0
 
B
k1

( 1)B k1

mBq2
B
 k1
 

k1;
mBq2
B
(T + 1)

+
NEmE 1P
k=0
1
k!

mE
E
k AAP
q=1
 
AA
q
h
Fb;k (T)
iq qP
q1=0
 
q
q1

( 1)q1
[(NB 1)(q q1)+AA q]P
q2=0
 
(NB 1)(q q1)+AA q
q2

( 1)q2B;q2


mB
B
B
exp

mBq0
B
+ mEE
 k+BP
k1=0
 
k+B
k1

( 1)k+B k1

mBq0
B
+ mEE
 k1
 

k1;

mBq0
B
+ mEE

(T + 1)
)
(26)
Corollary 3. When B ! 1 and E is fixed, the asymp-
totic ergodic secrecy rate of multiuser multi-antenna wiretap
networks with TAS/tSD scheme is given by
C
1
s;1 = 
1
1 +
1
2 (27)
where 11 and 
1
2 is provided by (28) and (29), respectively.
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix C.
In order to gain more insights, we also provide two metrics
i.e., the high SNR slope and the high SNR power offset, to
describe the asymptotic behavior of the ergodic secrecy rate
in the high SNR regime. We adopt a general form to rewrite
the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate as [1]
C
1
s;1 = S1 (log2B   1) (30)
where S1 denotes the high SNR slope in bits/s/Hz (3dB) and
1 is the high SNR power offset in 3dB units. According to
[1], the high SNR slope is given by
S1 = lim
B!1
C
1
s;1
log2B
(31)
Substituting (27) into (31) and performing some algebraic
manipulations, we have
S1 = 1 (32)
From (32), we find that the key parameters, such as the number
of legitimate users NB and of eavesdroppers NE as well as the
switched threshold T, have no impact on the high SNR slope.
Next, we turn our attention to the high SNR power offset 1,
which can be easily derived as follows:
1 = lim
B!1

log2B   C
1
s;1
S1

(33)
It is noted that (33) reflects the impact of main channel and
eavesdropping channel on the ergodic secrecy rate. Therefore,
inserting (30) and (31) into (33), 1 can be further expressed
as
1 = 1 (AA;mB) + 1 (NE;mE; E) ; (34)
where
1 (AA;mB) =  AA (mB)
AA 1P
q=0
 
AA 1
q

( 1)qB;q  (mB + B)
(1 + q) (mB+B)
h
 (mB+B)
ln 2   log2 (mB (1 + q))
i
(35)
and
1 (NE;mE; E) = 12 (36)
Based on the analysis above, we can draw the conclusion
that the high SNR offset is independent of B. Besides, the
positive impact of main channel on ergodic secrecy rate is
characterized by 1 (AA;mB), which is related to the key sys-
tem parameters of the legitimate channel, i.e., AA and mB. On
the other hand, the negative impact of eavesdropper’s channel
is characterized by 1 (NE;mE; E), which is associated with
the parameters of eavesdropping channel, i.e., NE;mE and E.
In addition, 1 (NE;mE; E) also explicitly quantifies the loss
of ergodic secrecy rate due to the behavior of the wiretapping
at Eves.
In the sequel, we take into account the case of B ! 1
and E ! 1 with a fixed MER BE = be and provide the
following corollary.
Corollary 4. The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate at B !
1 and E ! 1 with BE = be of multiuser multi-antenna
wiretap networks with TAS/tSD scheme is given by (37).
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11 =
AA
 (mB)
AA 1P
q=0
 
AA 1
q

( 1)qB;q  (mB + B) (1 + q) (mB+B)
h
 (mB+B)
ln 2   log2 (mB (1 + q))
i
+ log2 (B) (28)
12 =
1
ln 2
NEmE 1P
k=0
1
k!

mE
E
k "
( 1)k 1 exp

mE
E

Ei

 mEE

+
kP
k1=1
(k1   1)!( 1)k k1

mE
E
 k1#
(29)
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix D.
As can be observed from (37) that a rate ceiling exists in
this particular case. Once again, it demonstrates that increasing
the transmit power at the BS does not have a positive impact
on the ergodic secrecy rate when the eavesdropper is located
close to the transmitter.
D. Average Number of User Examinations
Compared with the best scheduling scheme, i.e., SC scheme,
where all the NB legitimate users are examined to select
the best one, tSD scheme only examines the legitimate user
adopted in the previous time slot. Once it is acceptable, there
is no need to check out the remaining (NB   1) legitimate
users. Hence, the average number of user examinations can
be expressed as [31]:
NavgTAS=tSD =
AAX
=1
h
1 + (NB   1)Fb;k (T)
i
(38)
For the SECps scheme, it examines the SNRs of additional
main links only if necessary. Once the SNR of the k-th
legitimate user is acceptable, there is no need to check out
the remaining SNRs of (NB   k) legitimate users. Hence, the
average number of user examinations can be characterized as
[22]
NavgTAS=SECps =
AAX
=1
NB 1X
k=0
h
Fb;k
(T)
ik
(39)
On the other hand, since 0  F
b;k
(T)  1, we haveh
Fb;k
(T)
ik
< Fb;k
(T) ; k 2 f1; 2; :::; NB   1g (40)
By jointly taking (38), (39) and (40) into account, we have
NavgTAS=SECps  NavgTAS=tSD  AANB (41)
As a result, the implementation cost of TAS/tSD scheme is
higher than that of TAS/SECps scheme, while it is lower than
TAS/SC scheme.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present some numerical results to validate
the aforementioned secrecy analysis and analyze the joint
impact of key parameters on the secrecy performance of the
considered system.
Fig. 2 presents the secrecy outage probability and asymp-
totic secrecy outage probability versus different average le-
gitimate user’s SNR B in Case I. It is observed from the
figure that the theoretical results of secrecy outage probability
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Fig. 2: Secrecy outage probability in Case I versus different
B for E = 0dB, T = 10dB, mE = 1 and NB = NE = 2.
in (17) match precisely with the Monte Carlo simulations and
the high SNR curves given by (18) agree very well with the
exact ones in the high SNR regime and accurately predict the
secrecy diversity order and secrecy array gain. Furthermore,
increasing the number of antennas at the BS and the channel
fading severity parameter of legitimate channel have positive
impact on the secrecy performance. This is due to the fact that
more number of transmit antennas results in larger transmit
diversity gains and the higher mB means the better channel
quality of legitimate channel. Additionally, as can be expected,
the secrecy outage probability of TAS/tSD scheme degrades
with the increment of the predefined secrecy rate Rs, and
increasing Rs does not influence the secrecy diversity order
as indicated by the parallel slopes of the asymptotes.
Fig. 3 illustrates the secrecy outage probability of the
system with different NB. As illustrated in the figure, we
observe that the secrecy performance can be improved as
increasingNB for the particular case when B  T. However,
when B  T, increasing the number of legitimate users
NB has marginal impact on the secrecy outage performance
due to no additional secrecy diversity order. Moreover, the
better secrecy performance can be achieved with the larger
predefined switched threshold T, while the TAS/tSD scheme
and TAS/SECps scheme turn into the TAS/SC scheme as T
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C
1
s;2 = log2 (be) +AA
AA 1P
q=0
 
AA 1
q

( 1)qB;q  (mB+B) (mB) (1 + q)
 (mB+B)
h
 (mB+B)
ln 2   log2 (mB (1 + q))
i
  (NEmE)ln 2 + log2 (mE)
(37)
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Fig. 3: Secrecy outage probability versus NB with different
B and T for AA = 2, mB = mE = 1, NE = 2, Rs = 1 and
E = 0dB.
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Fig. 4: Secrecy outage probability in Case II versus B for
AA = 3; NB = 4; NE = 2;mB = 2;mE = 1; Rs = 1 with
different T and be.
approaches to infinite.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy outage probability versus B with
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Fig. 5: Ergodic secrecy rate versus B with different AA; NB
and mB settings as well as T = 10dB, NE = 2 and mE = 2.
different T and be in Case II. As shown obviously in
the figure, the larger switched threshold T results in better
secrecy performance since more legitimate users have been
examined. It can also be observed that at a fixed MER be, the
secrecy outage probability improves with B in the low SNR
area, however the improvement tends to be saturated in the
medium and high SNR area. This is attributed to the fact that
the MER is the bottleneck of the secrecy outage probability. In
addition, we can see that the secrecy outage probability floor
decreases with the increment of MER.
Fig. 5 depicts the ergodic secrecy rate of the system with
TAS/tSD scheme against different NB in Case I. It can be
observed that the curves of ergodic secrecy rate generated by
(24) are in exact agreement with the Monte Carlo simulations
and the curves of asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate in (27) well
approximate the analytical ones in the high SNR regimes. We
also observe that, both the number of legitimate users NB
and antenna configurations contribute to the improvement of
ergodic secrecy rate in the low B regime, where the TAS/tSD
scheme is equal to NB-legitimate users TAS/SC scheme and
multiuser diversity gain is achieved. However, in the high B
regime, BS intends to schedule the first user, and thus the
ergodic secrecy rate is independent of the number of legitimate
users NB. From another point of view, the high power offset
1 in (34) is not relevant to the number of legitimate users
NB under this case. It needs to be pointed out that, in contrast
with the secrecy outage probability, increasing the fading
severity parameter of the legitimate channel slightly degrades
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Fig. 6: Ergodic secrecy rate versus B with different T for
AA = 2, NB = 8, NE = 2, mB = mE = 1 and E = 0dB.
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Fig. 7: High SNR slope S1 versus B with different system
parameters.
the ergodic secrecy rate. In addition, as can be expected,
increasing the number of eavesdroppers can considerably
improve the wiretapping capability of colluding eavesdropper,
which leads to the increment of the high power offset 1, and
thus degrades secrecy performance of the considered systems.
Fig. 6 shows that the ergodic secrecy rate improves with the
increase of the switched threshold T. This is due to the fact
that the scheduler has more opportunities to adopt TAS/SC
scheme as the switched threshold increases, thus it yields a
better performance at the expense of higher complexity. That
is to say, when T comes close to infinity, the TAS/tSD scheme
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Fig. 8: Ergodic secrecy rate in Case II versus B for AA =
2; NB = 2; NE = 2;mB = 2;mE = 1 with different T and
be.
completely turns into the TAS/SC scheme. In addition, it is ob-
served that the TAS/tSD scheme outperforms the TAS/SECps
scheme regardless of switched threshold T. Fig. 7 presents
the impact of key system parameters AA;mB; NE;mE and E
on the high SNR slope S1. As illustrated in the figure, the key
system parameters of the legitimate channel AA and mB have
a positive impact on the high SNR slope. However, when the
parameters related with eavesdropping channel, i.e., NE, mE
or E increases, the speed of convergence to 1 slows down.
This is because that the second term on the right hand side of
(34) has a great impact on the high SNR slope S1.
Fig. 8 shows the ergodic secrecy rate versus B with
different T and be in Case II. It is shown in Fig. 8 that
the exact curves of (24) are still in good agreement with
the Monte Carlo simulations, and the asymptotic results in
(20) predict the exact ones precisely in the high SNR area.
Similar to the secrecy outage probability in Case II, we find
that the increment of switched threshold T contributes to the
improvement of the ergodic secrecy rate. It can be observed
that at a fixed MER be, the ergodic secrecy rate increases
with B in the low SNR area, but tends to a rate ceiling in
the medium and high SNR area. This is due to the fact that
the MER is the bottleneck of the ergodic secrecy rate under
this case. Furthermore, we also find that increasing the MER
leads to the reduction of rate ceiling.
Fig. 9 presents the saving percentage of the number of
legitimate user estimations, i.e.,

1 NavgTAS=tSD=AA=NB

.
As illustrated in this figure, the saving percentage of TAS/tSD
scheme reduces to zero as the switched threshold increases. By
jointly considering Fig. 3, Fig. 6 and Fig. 9, we find that the
TAS/tSD scheme achieves better secrecy performance than the
TAS/SECps scheme at the expense of negligible complexity
cost, and achieves a similar performance as TAS/SC scheme
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Fig. 9: The reduced percentage of number of user examinations
versus switched thresholds T with different NB and B,
where AA = 2 and mB = 2.
while maintaining a lower number of user estimations load
compared with TAS/SC scheme.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive secrecy
performance analysis of multiuser multi-antenna wiretap net-
works with the TAS/tSD scheme. Particularly, the secrecy
performance of two practical scenarios was addressed with
respect to the availability of the CSI of the eavesdropping
channel at the BS. When the BS has the full knowledge of the
eavesdropper’s CSI, we have derived closed-form exact ex-
pressions of the secrecy outage probability and the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity, which provides a fast and effi-
cient way to evaluate the secrecy performance of the system.
Moreover, simple and informative high SNR approximations
for the secrecy outage probability were derived under two
distinct cases, which enable us to exploit more insights about
the impact of the key parameters on the secrecy performance.
For the case of eavesdropper’s CSI is not available at the
BS, we have investigated in detail the ergodic secrecy rate
achieved by the system with TAS/tSD scheme. In doing so,
novel closed-form expressions for the exact and asymptotic
ergodic secrecy rate were derived. Our results demonstrate
that when the switched threshold being carefully selected, the
TAS/tSD scheme outperforms the TAS/SECps scheme in terms
of the secrecy performance at the expense of little complexity
cost, while maintaining a lower number of user estimations
load compared with TAS/SC scheme.
APPENDIX A
A DETAILED DERIVATION FOR COROLLARY 1
In the high SNR regime, i.e., B !1 with a fixed E, the
CDF of b;k can be approximated as
Fb;k
(x)  mB
mB
(mB)!

x
B
mB
(42)
By inserting (42) into (8) and using the law of binomial
theorem, we have
F
B
(x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
AAP
q=0
 
AA
q
h
mB
mB
(mB)!

T
B
mBiq qP
q1=0
 
q
q1

( 1)q1

h
mB
mB
(mB)!

x
B
mBi(NB 1)(q q1)+AA q
; x  Th
mB
mB
(mB)!

x
B
mBiAANB
; x < T
(43)
As such, by plugging (43) into (16) and neglecting the
higher order terms, with the help of [41, Eqs. (3.381.3) and
(3.351.3)], the desired asymptotic outage probability Pout (Rs)
can be easily derived as (18) after some simple mathematical
manipulations.
APPENDIX B
A DERIVATION FOR SOME INTEGRAL EQUATIONS
In this Appendix, we present some useful results on the
solution of some integrals, which will be frequently adopted
to evaluate some performance metrics.
Consider the following first integralZ v
0
exp ( ux) xk
1 + x
dx (44)
= exp (u)
kX
k1=0

k
k1

( 1)k k1
 u k1 [  (k1; u)    (k1; u (v + 1))]
Proof: Let y = 1 + x, then we haveZ v
0
exp ( ux) xk
1 + x
dx =
Z v+1
1
exp ( u (y   1)) (y   1)k
y
dy
(45a)
By adopting the binomial theorem, the above expression can
be further expanded asZ v
0
exp ( ux) xk
1 + x
dx (45b)
= exp (u)
kX
k1=0

k
k1

( 1)k k1
Z v+1
1
exp ( uy) yk1 1dy
= exp (u)
kX
k1=0

k
k1

( 1)k k1

Z 1
1
exp ( ux)xk1 1dx 
Z 1
v+1
exp ( ux)xk1 1dx

(45c)
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With the aid of variable substitution operation y = ux, and
resorting to the upper incomplete gamma function in [41, Eq.
(8.350.2)] as   (; ) =
R1

e tt 1dt, we obtainZ v+1
1
exp ( ux)xk1 1dx=u k1 [  (k1; u)    (k1; u (v+1))]
(45d)
Finally, by substituting (45d) into (45b), therefore we complete
the proof of (44).
Consider the following second integralZ 1
v
exp ( ux)
1 + x
dx = exp (u)   (0; u (1 + v)) (46)
Proof: Similarly, with the operation of variable substitu-
tion y = 1 + x, we haveZ 1
v
exp ( ux)
1 + x
dx =
Z 1
1+v
exp ( u (y   1))
y
dy (47a)
and then let z = uy, we haveZ 1
v
exp ( ux)
1 + x
dx = exp (u)
Z 1
u(1+v)
exp ( z)
z
dz (47b)
Resorting to the upper incomplete gamma function in [41, Eq.
(8.350.2)], the desired result can be derived.
Consider the following third integralZ 1
v
exp ( ux) xk
1 + x
dx
= exp (u)
kX
k1=0

k
k1

( 1)k k1

1
uk1
  (k1; u (v + 1))

(48)
Proof: Similar to the proofs above, arming with variable
substitution y = 1 + x, z = uy and resorting to the upper
incomplete gamma function in [41, Eq. (8.350.2)], we obtain
the important integral equations.
APPENDIX C
A DETAILED DERIVATION FOR COROLLARY 3
Before probing into the analysis of the asymptotic ergodic
secrecy rate, we first rewrite the CDF of E as FE (y) =
1  'E (y), where
'E (y) = exp

 mEyE
NEmE 1P
k=0
1
k!

mEy
E
k
(49)
To this end, with the help of (49), the ergodic secrecy rate can
be re-expressed as
Cs;1 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z x
0
1  'E (y)
1 + y
dyfB (x) dx = 1 +2
(50)
where
1 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
ln (1 + x)fB (x) dx (51)
and
2 =   1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z x
0
'E (y)
1 + y
fB (x) dydx (52)
Now, in the following, we discuss the characteristics of 1
and 2 in the high SNR regime, respectively. According to
the basic idea of tSD scheme, when B !1, the probability
that each SNR of the main link bk exceeds the predefined
threshold T approaches one. That is to say, the instantaneous
SNR of the main channel reduces to B = b;k, the PDF of
which can be characterized by
fB (x) 
AA
  (mB)
AA 1X
q=0

AA   1
q

( 1)qB;q

mB
B
mB+B
xmB+B 1 exp

 mB (q + 1)
B
x

(53)
As x ! 1, we have ln (1 + x)  x, thus, 1 asymptoti-
cally turns into
11 =
Z 1
0

log2 (B)+log2

x
B

fB (x) dx
= log2 (B) +
Z 1
0
log2

x
B

fB (x) dx (54)
Now, by utilizing the PDF of B and resorting to [41,
Eq.(4.352.1)], we have 11 as (28), where  () denotes the
digamma function [42].
In what follows, by exchanging the order of integration in
2, therefore, 2 can be rewritten as
2 =   1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z x
0
'E (y)
1 + y
fB (x) dydx
=   1
ln 2
Z 1
0
'E (y)
1 + y
(1  FB (x)) dy (55)
Depending on the CDF expression in (8), as B ! 1, we
have FB (x)! 0. Hence, 2 can be further expressed as
12 =  
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
'E (y)
1 + y
dy (56)
As such, by utilizing (49) and resorting to [41, Eq. (3.353.5)],
the asymptotic expression of 2 can be derived as (29) after
some mathematical manipulations. Finally, summing up 11
and 12 yields the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate C
1
s;1.
APPENDIX D
A DETAILED DERIVATION FOR COROLLARY 4
When B ! 1 and E ! 1 with BE = be, the
asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate can be conveniently achieved
according to the proof of Corollary 3 in Appendix E. To be
specific, what we need to do is just considering the asymptotic
behavior for 12 as B !1. Following the similar procedure
developed in [40] and observing 11 in (54), the asymptotic
expression for 12 is given by
12;2 =  log2 (E) 
Z 1
0
log2

y
E

fE (y) dy (57)
By plugging the PDF of B in (53) into (57) and capitalizing
on the equation [41, Eq.(4.352.1)], we have
12;2 =  log2 (E) 
 (NEmE)
ln 2
+ log2 (mE) (58)
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Therefore, by summing up the new asymptotic result (58) for
12 and (28) into (50), we eventually obtain (37) and complete
the proof.
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